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It is a truism that as social scientists we are 
constrained in our thinking by the dominant 
beliefs and intellectual climate of our time. Kaplan 
(1964) has pointed out that some values in scienti­
fic beliefs arise through what he calls key meta­
phors in various periods of history: fruitful 
comparisons which stimulate the imagination of 
the age. The eighteenth century was given to 
clockwork conceptions, the nineteenth to organis- 
mic ideas; and now in the twentieth century we 
tend to make scientific formulations in terms of 
the workings of a computer.
What is noticeable about these conceptual 
devices is that (a) semantically they are all meta­
phors, (b) functionally they all serve to relate 
events or discoveries into coherent systems, 
(c) formally they are in some sense models of 
reality for heuristic purposes, and (d) they all 
involve the implied use of analogy.
The intention in this paper is to review the use 
of model and metaphor in one social science, 
social anthropology; to come in this context to a 
better understanding of the working distinction 
between these terms; and finally to appraise their 
usefulness and comprehensiveness for this 
discipline.
EARLY M O D ELS
The model in some sense has been at least 
implicitly used since the beginning of social 
anthropology. It was originally connected with 
social change, a subject in which many workers of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were 
interested. Against a background of Darwinian
evolutionism and contemporary anthropological 
and historical studies (e.g. Bastian 1860; Buckle 
1857-61; Lubbock 1855; Waitz 1858) they assumed 
that a given society was both stable and at a 
certain stage of development. The problem was 
then to discover or surmize what had happened to 
it before this stage, and what further changes it 
was likely to experience in the future.
In general terms, all societies were posited as 
passing in social evolution through the stages of 
savagery and barbarism to civilization. This was 
an organismic model into which various societies 
examined (usually from the literature) could be 
fitted and classified. The apotheosis of this 
scheme was of course Victorian society from which 
the investigators themselves sprang and had their 
being. Nevertheless, it had all the rough-and- 
ready taxonomic advantages of an early model. 
Moreover, as a good model surely should, it 
stimulated research. Using this model, Morgan 
(1878) and McLennan (1897) devised an evolution­
ary sequence for the family. Corresponding 
sequences for law were suggested by Maine (1897) 
in England and Letourneau (1890) in France. In the 
sphere of religion, Tylor (1865) and Frazer (1890) 
postulated appropriate stages, as did the French 
workers Lefevre (1891) and Mauss (1896).
Many of these writers accepted foreign and 
bizarre customs as evidence for the validity of 
postulated but unobserved stages of the model. 
Where fact would not support fiction, the model 
was deduced by argument. Paternity, it was 
maintained, could never have arisen until the stage 
of polygamy was reached. Hence patrilineal de-
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scent and inheritance necessarily belonged to 
the higher forms of society (Achelis 1890).
Models of this Kind, with only one central theme 
and few detailed ramifications, might be called 
unithematic. They seem to have an essential 
place in the early stages of enquiry when the field 
needs to be delineated in broad black and white 
terms. A s  more sophisticated material comes in, 
they become more and more naive and unsatis­
factory, and, their job done, are finally repudiated.
A s  the evolutionary unithematic model was 
gradually abandoned in the face of mounting 
scientific criticism, its place was taken for a while 
by a diffusion model. The problem here was to 
trace the spread of culture items, mainly techni­
ques and material objects, through past migra­
tions. Apparently, however, the time was not yet 
ripe for inductive verification by fieldwork, although 
the model made this possible and desirable. 
Perry (1927) tried very persistently to show from 
the literature that wherever practices such as 
building pyramids, mummifying the dead and 
wearing gold and pearl ornaments existed, they 
had been introduced by the ancient Egyptians, or 
by people in contact with them. This model must 
still be described as unithematic.
Hogbin (1958), to whom much of the material for 
this summary is due, believes that in England a 
modern reorientation set in just before 1920. The 
younger anthropologists realised that the method 
of conjectural history, as Radcliffe-Brown later 
called it (1952), was unscientific because the 
conclusions could never be verified. At the same 
time it came to be generally accepted that students 
should not only visit the areas of investigation 
themselves, but should learn the vernacular and 
engage in participant observation. Yet the in­
fluence of the earlier evolutionary model and its 
operators was felt for another decade, at least to 
the extent that students continued to be attracted 
by the unfamiliar. They selected remote societies 
for study, and where they were obliged to investi­
gate a culture which had "broken down", they 
tried through the tribal elders to recapture the 
unspoilt past. Malinowski himself, to whom so 
much of modern fieldwork technique is owed, 
makes only casual references to the Europeans 
and missionaries who had been living in the 
Trobriand Islands for fully twenty years before he 
first reached them in 1915 (Malinowski 1922; 1935).
Still another characteristic was involved in the
new model to come. A s  Mitchell has indicated 
(1961), Malinowski, and Radcliffe-Brown in his 
earlier period (1922), studied small-scale island 
communities in which it was possible to see the 
whole society in action. Redfield denoted this as 
the "period of study of simple societies con­
ceived as self-contained autonomous societies" 
(1955). Whether such a limitation of field helped to 
determine the functional biological model or was 
in turn determined by it is difficult to say at this 
distance. In any event, the new model transfixed 
in immobility societies which had previously been 
seen in process of change. The model required 
that the parts of society should be seen in func­
tional interdependence, after the analogy of the 
need-satisfying components of a biological 
organism. It was hard enough to analyse out the 
social parts in interrelationship without the added 
difficulty of treating these parts as variables in 
social change. The institutions of society were 
accordingly taken as constants in terms of the 
needs they met. This connected with a further 
presupposition— important for later work— that 
their total interactional condition was one of 
stable equilibrium. It is significant that Malinow­
ski's later attempts on the basis of this model to 
interpret social change and "culture contact” are 
generally acknowledged to be the least successful 
of his work (Gluckman 1948; Malinowski 1945; 
Mitchell 1961). On the other hand, it was obvious 
from his writings (e.g. 1926), that Malinowski was 
fully emancipated from the errors of "conjecture 
or hypothetical reconstruction” and was anxious 
that his model of society should correspond with 
reality. This is the first anthropological model 
which could be called truly polythematic.
S O C IA L  S T R U C T U R E  M O D ELS  
It fell mainly to Radcliffe-Brown, influenced no 
doubt by his philosophical and logical training at 
Cambridge, to develop the functional biological 
model into a biological structural one. Functional 
interdependence on the analogy between social 
and organic life was retained (1952) and conscious­
ly referred back to its early formulation in Durk- 
heim (1919). While the dangers of the biological 
analogy were fully realised, it was extended in a 
not particularly helpful way to designate areas of 
study as social morphology, social physiology and 
social evolution (Radcliffe-Brown 1952). The 
concept of general human needs taken up by 
Malinowski was played down by Radcliffe-Brown,
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and replaced by a narrower and more technical 
definition in terms of "necessary conditions of 
existence".
This was required because of the notion of 
"structure" which Radcliffe-Brown superimposed 
on the biological model. Even in Malinowski’s 
usage, the social organism was a closed structure 
or system, in the sense that it had outer physical 
limits and was internally self-functioning. More­
over, the term “structure" was already in current 
use, often in reference to the form of persistent 
social groups. But it was Radcliffe-Brown who in 
social anthropology gave ordered expression to 
the concept and embodied it in his functional 
working hypothesis. Using a metaphor, he defined 
social structure as a “network of actually existing 
social relations", but included also the differentia­
tion of individuals and classes by social role. This 
structural emphasis led attention away from the 
organismic aspects of the model, which in effect 
became metaphorical in character. Human needs 
were less directly important than the harmonious 
functioning together of the parts Of the social 
structure. Function was now defined in terms of 
"sufficient . . . internal consistency, i.e. without 
producing conflicts which can neither be resolved 
not regulated” (1952: p. 181).
While the assumption of general human needs 
could be put aside in this scheme, Malinowski’s 
concept of stable equilibrium was as important as 
ever. In terms of the organic analogy, Radcliffe- 
Brown considered deviations from stability as 
pathological. Disequilibrium was given a value 
judgment as a diseased condition of the social 
organism, producing dysnomia, disorder, social 
ill-health, as opposed to the eunomia of the 
healthy integrated society (1952: p. 182). This value 
assumption was to have unfortunate conse­
quences, not only for the effective study of social 
change, but for later investigations of large-scale, 
complex societies.
Homans was an early critic of the biological 
structural model. He found fault with the argument 
that because some recurrent activity is "organic­
ally" interrelated with other activities, it neces­
sarily makes a contribution to social survival. 
"The interrelatedness of the elements of social 
behaviour may be dysfunctional as well as func­
tional", he wrote (Homans 1951: p. 271). Hogbin, 
too, has questioned Radcliffe-Brown's organic 
reification of society: "There is no point in saying
that a certain custom has an integrative function 
for the society as a whole; and to state that society 
in a state of dysnomja always struggles towards 
eunomia is to cloud the issues. It is rather indivi­
dual persons who combine into new groups when 
they find that some common aim is best achieved 
thereby . . . ” (Hogbin 1958: p. 29).
The idea is tempting that over the years the 
biological aspect of the biological structural model 
has dwindled from analogy through metaphor into 
meaninglessness. What is clear is that (a) once 
the tendency to functional interdependence of at 
least clusters of social institutions was accepted, 
the organismic analogy had fulfilled its purpose, 
and (b) the social structure model is capable of 
separate logically self-consistent existence. The 
result has been that various forms of social 
structure models have made their appearance 
without overt biological implications. Even these, 
however, have rested on the presuppositions of 
closure and stability characteristic of their biologi­
cal prototypes.
Leach has criticized these presuppositions, and 
in the process has produced another type of 
structural model (1954). Anthropologists, he says, 
are almost alone in regarding social change as 
shattering and somehow fundamentally immoral. 
Their prejudice in favour of integration, functional 
consistency and structural equilibrium is the out­
come of the conditions under which they work. An 
analysis torn out of time and space in the course 
of a year or two’s fieldwork requires the axiom of 
equilibrium, for without it the model would appear 
to be incomplete. But they go too far in assuming 
that the equilibrium is stable, i.e. firmly estab­
lished and unlikely to suffer sudden change.
When the anthropologist attempts to describe 
a social system, Leach goes on, he necessarily 
describes only a model of the social reality. The 
model represents the anthropologist's hypothesis 
of "how the social system works”, and is therefore 
a coherent whole. This does not imply, however, 
that social reality is a coherent whole: on the 
contrary it is full of inconsistencies, which provide 
an understanding of social change. Butin practical 
fieldwork situations the material observed must be 
treated as if it were part of an equilibrium system, 
or description would be "almost impossible". 
All that Leach asks is that the fictitious nature of 
this equilibrium be fully recognised. His descrip­
tion of a social system provides an idealized
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model which states the "correct" status relations 
existing between groups within the total social 
system, and between the social persons who make 
up the particular groups.
The logical attempts made here to reconcile the 
model with reality are interesting, and may be 
summarized under the heading of dissociation. In 
contrast with Radcliffe-Brown, the model is firstly 
of idealized status relations as opposed to actual 
"person-to-person” ones. It is an idealized struc­
tural model, which allows unwanted idiosyncratic 
variations to be dissociated or excluded. Again, 
the equilibrium of the model is dissociated from 
the disequilibrium of reality, and the two are 
connected only by a tenuous "a s-if" relationship. 
The model marks an advance in (a) dispensing 
with the biological analogy which had become 
only a metaphor, (b) recognizing fully the non- 
integrated nature of more complex societies, and 
(c) opening the door to an analysis of social 
change. The price paid is the new problem of the 
criteria by which the anthropologist's model, 
since it is dissociated from reality, shall be tested 
against it.
Anthropologists are not alone in being casti­
gated for regarding social systems as closed and 
social change as shattering. Dahrendorf (1958) 
has taken the sociologists to task for much the 
same fault. He has, he says, yet to see a problem 
for the explanation of which the assumption of a 
unified value system is necessary, or a testable 
prediction which follows from this assumption. 
One of the more unfortunate connotations of the 
word “system" is its closure. Although some 
structural functionalists have tried to, there is no 
getting away from the fact that a system— if only 
for "purpose of analysis"— is self-sufficient, 
internally consistent, and closed to the outside. 
By no feat of the imagination can the integrated 
and equilibrated social system be made to produce 
serious and patterned conflicts in its structure. 
What it does produce is the well-known villain of 
the piece, the deviant. He quotes early Parsons: 
"Deviance is a motivated tendency for an actor to 
behave in contravention of one or more institu­
tionalized normative patterns" (1951; p. 250); and 
deviance occurs "either if an individual happens to 
be pathological, or if, from whatever source, a 
disturbance is introduced into the system" (p. 252). 
. Dahrendorf recommends as a corrective a 
problem-conscious discipline (1958: p. 124).
Problems require explanation; explanations re­
quire assumptions or models, and hypotheses 
derived from such models. These hypotheses are 
always, by implication, predictions as well as 
explanatory propositions, and require testing by 
further facts. Testing in turn often generates new 
problems. He also emphasizes the usefulness of a 
conflict mode! of society, based on the presuppo­
sitions that (a) continuous social change is taking 
place unless some force intervenes to arrest it, 
(b) social conflict is ubiquitous: its absence is 
surprising and abnormal, and (c) societies are 
held together not by consensus but by constraint. 
Dahrendorf does not insist that the conflict model 
is the only one. Problems for study can be selected 
in terms of the equilibrium model or the conflict 
one, or perhaps of other models too. He points 
out, though, that the models with which we work, 
apart from being useful tools, determine to no 
small extent our general perspectives, our selec­
tion of problems and the emphasis of our explana­
tions. He might also have indicated that these 
factors help to determine our models.
In social anthropology, Gluckman and his 
co-workers, generalizing initially on rural field­
work in Central Africa, have for long urged that 
conflict, ambiguity and inconsistency are charac­
teristic of social change. Gluckman has empha­
sized that conflicts in men’s allegiances in one set 
of relationships lead to cohesion through cross­
cutting alliances over a wider range of relations, 
orthrough a longer period of time (Gluckman 1955). 
Mitchell has crystallized the concept of conflict in 
the notion of the "plural society” (1961), after 
Furnivall (1948). Here, disparate systems of 
customs and beliefs coexist, and are called into 
action in different social situations. Mitchell does 
not entirely accept Gluckman’s theory of "counter­
balancing cleavages", but seems more to agree 
with Dahrendorf that constraint rather than 
consensus is the basis of cohesion in plural 
societies. His eventual working model of "complex 
reticulations of social relationships" does not, 
however, appear to differ greatly from Epstein's 
"different sets of social relations or spheres of 
social interaction" (1958: p. xvii). Gluckman has 
expressed a similar view of "loose, semi-indepen­
dent, to some extent isolated sub-systems" 
(1961: p. 80). With all these scholars, despite their 
full recognition of conflict and inconsistency, it is 
not difficult to discern the underlying search for a
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systematic model: the "cross-cutting alliances” 
of Gluckman, the "complex reticulations" of 
Mitchell, and Epstein's "spheres of social inter­
action". It would appear that the social structure 
model has been forced into “semi-independent 
sub-systems" mainly because of the disconnected 
nature of the data themselves.
There are other versions of the social structure 
model which by their formulation avoid, or at least 
accept more naturally, the pressures imposed by 
social disunity. One of the most valuable is that 
of Nadel (1957), who, following Parsons (1954), 
defines the structure of a society as the pattern or 
network (or "system") of relationships between 
"actors in their capacity of playing roles relative to 
one another" (Nadel 1957: p. 12). The notion of role 
has been curiously neglected as a formal concept 
in anthropological models (Reader 1961: p. 212). 
It enables Nadel to make the important distinction 
between corporate groups, in which membership 
has all the characteristics of role-performance, 
and institutionalized social relationships, analysis 
of which proceeds pari passu (1957: p. 60). Occa­
sionally, says Nadel, anthropologists have chosen 
a mode of presentation whereby they single out 
particular roles and outline social structure on 
this basis, reaching it by way of a role inventory 
(e.g. certain kinship roles in Eggan 1950; Fortes 
1949). Generally, however, roles are only described 
as they become relevant.
The great advantage of the role structure model 
is that it provides effortlessly for conflict, ambiguity 
and inconsistency without further presuppositions 
such as "as-if" relations or plural societies. 
Nobody has any difficulty in visualizing incompat­
ible roles performed by one and the same individual 
or group; roles which are ambiguous, either 
deliberately in a fluid social situation or because 
they are new and have not had time to crystallize; 
or roles which are inconsistent in one social 
situation compared with another. Moreover, Nadel 
makes full allowance for cleavages in the structure. 
Absence of a common logical locus, he says, 
precludes the assumption of a unitary, coherent 
role system. Indeed, there seem to be as many 
separate systems as there are logical role-frames. 
Between them there is only the linkage provided by 
recruitment rules, defining the flow or "circula­
tion" of persons between disparate sets of roles, 
and the chances of their belonging to several at 
once (Nadel 1957: p. 97).
Nadel is also able to deal with the principle of 
equilibrium. Purely objectively, and ignoring the 
viewpoint of welfare, he says, human communities 
in a state of equilibrium are neither better nor 
worse, neither more nor less interesting, than any 
other state. The assumption of equilibrium is 
important only in that it makes sense to look for 
determinacy; and the constancies observed in 
field anthropology are certainly of short range 
(1957: p. 145). It is clear, however, that the short­
term constancy of a particular logical role frame, 
not changing its shape "a s  soon as our backs are 
turned", is all that is required to satisfy the condi­
tions of Nadel’s model. If no workable constancies 
emerge, then there is no society to study and no 
structure to define.
Borrowing from Levi-Strauss (1953: p. 528) 
Nadel calls social structure a "statistical model", 
in the sense that it has the same degree of reality 
(or, as he says, non-reality) which would be 
ascribed to any purely statistical picture of a social 
situation. By contrast there are "mechanical 
models" of societies, exemplified by their valid 
laws: marriage laws, for example "calling for 
actual groupings of the individuals according to 
clan and kin". It is only the pragmatic design of 
societies, their body of rules backed by sanctions, 
which can be ascribed concrete efficacy and 
"real” consequences. The statistical model can 
have no such effectiveness, but provides only 
"thresholds" (L6vi-Strauss), zones of indeter­
minacy, and hence indices of the probability 
which its Constances apply (Nadel 1957: pp. 147- 
148).
This attempt to operate an idealized structural 
form through the medium of an actual structural 
model resting on the tradition of Malinowski and 
Radcliffe-Brown, leads to severe difficulties. 
Radcliffe-Brown believed he knew what he wanted 
as the basis of social structure— the "concrete 
reality" of actually existing social relations (1952: 
p. 192). Gluckman, in an intermediate position, 
builds his model on “typical" or representative 
events (1942: p. 245). These may not accurately 
describe any actual social events, but represent 
the type of behaviour that underlies actual events 
in a given community. This formulation shows a 
keener appreciation of the inductive first-degree- 
abstraction process by which field data are 
classified from the level of observation. Finally, 
the possibility arises, as utilized by Leach, of
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stating the "correct" or idealized relations which 
the anthropologist thinks should exist between 
social persons.
A t this point it may be useful to make a distinc­
tion between ideal, idealized and ideational 
models. An  ideal model is built on what are 
sometimes called normative patterns of behaviour. 
These are at the level of descriptions by infor­
mants, or comments by them, on what "ideal" in 
the sense of perfect or rational behaviour should 
be. In the courts of law such behaviour is often 
laid down, and actual behaviour assessed against 
it, in terms of the concept defined by Giuckman in 
the "reasonable (and upright) man" (1955b: p. 22). 
In an idealized model, on the other hand, "the 
concepts and relations chosen ... are not given by 
nature, but are largely the invention of the investi­
gator. They are governed primarily by the way in 
which he thinks it ‘profitable to represent ex­
perience'” (Firth 1954: p. 7). Such, according to 
Firth, is the economist's model. L6vi-Strauss, too, 
points out that “social structure has nothing to do 
with empirical reality but with models built after 
it” ; and these must be such that "they make 
immediately intelligible all the observed facts" 
(1953: p. 525). Leach, similarly, seems to think that 
structural analysis is only tenuously connected 
with reality. The structures which the anthro­
pologist describes, he says, are nothing more real 
than "models which exist as logical constructions 
in his mind." (Leach 1954: pp. 5, 9).
Nadel makes an attempt to square the idealized 
models of Leach and L6vi-Strauss with his own 
inclinations, moulded by the British school of 
anthropology, towards an empirical model. All 
empirical models, by definition, are inductive: that 
is to say, their terms and relations are arrived at 
by the logical process of generalization from 
repeated, similar, particular instances of observed 
phenomena. This abstraction, at the first level, is 
performed in the very act of recognizing and 
separating out a particular phenomenon for 
description (Beattie 1959: p. 48). We thus never 
analyse reality directly, and to think that we do is 
to misunderstand fundamentally the process of 
induction. The “concrete reality of social struc­
ture” is a logical contradiction: the basic terms of 
any model, social structural or otherwise, are at 
least first-level abstractions. Empirical models are 
therefore at least inductive, second-level generali­
zations of first-level abstractions derived from
observation. So  are ideal models, but they are 
based on normative conceptions as framed by 
Informants. Ideational models, as will presently 
emerge, may or may not be inductive. Idealized 
ones are by definition not inductive but deductive. 
They are convenient, imaginative constructions, 
deduced from general experience to fit "reality" 
as seen by the operator.
Nadel seems both to have misconceived induc­
tion and to have been torn between empirical and 
idealized models. Following Radcliffe-Brown (1952: 
p. 192), he writes: " I consider social structure, of 
whatever degree of refinement, to be still the social 
reality itself, or an aspect of it, not the logic behind 
it; and I consider structural analysis to be no more 
than a descriptive method, however sophisticated, 
not a piece of explanation." (Nadel 1957: pp. ISO- 
151). He admits, after Braithwaite (1953: pp. 90-91, 
108) that a model implies more than this, namely a 
"picture” so constructed that it has a logical 
necessity and explanatory power, so that verifiable 
deductions can be made from it. But he does not 
think that "social structure" satisfies this more 
rigorous condition. In point of fact, if the present 
analysis is correct, Nadel could have found 
satisfaction in either of two broad types of model?: 
the empirical one, generalized from reality and’ 
modelled on it, or the idealized one, deduced from 
general social experience and capable of being 
verified by reference to it. Instead, his position 
forced him to the regrettable conclusion that what 
makes structural analysis informative is not the 
final picture at all, but the analytic steps that lead 
up to it (1957: p. 154).
To complete this analysis, there remains to be 
considered the ideational model— the model of 
social ideas. A  classical exposition of this type is 
in the social philosophy of Emile Durkheim (trahs. 
1953). Sociology, he says, studies a normative 
model of society, and not the distorted model 
constructed from an expression of public opinion 
(1953: p. xvi). There is an enormous gap between 
the way in which values are actually estimated by 
the ordinary individual and the objective scale of 
human values which should in principle govern 
our judgments. The average moral conscience is 
mediocre; it feels only slightly the commonest 
duties, and is blind to some (1953: p. 83). Moreover, 
because a certain condition is found in a large 
number of people, it is not for that reason "ob­
jective". The “general" phenomenon itself, in
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relation to the behaviour of the majority of indivi­
duals, may be of relatively infrequent occurrence 
(p. xii). Such a conception of social fact rests on 
the assumption that society is a system of ideas, 
beliefs and sentiments, working through, but over 
and above, the individual minds and ideas falling 
within it (p. 59).
This ideational model deals best, as one might 
expect, with the ideological and value aspects of 
society. Civilization, Durkheim points out, is the 
result of the co-operation of men in association 
through successive generations. It is essentially 
a social product: a “congregation” of the highest 
human values. We can receive from this store­
house of intellectual and moral riches at most a 
few fragments. The more we advance in time, the 
more complex and immense does our civilization 
become. Consequently, the more does it transcend 
the individual consciousness, and the smaller does 
the individual feel in relation to it (Durkheim 1953: 
p. 54). Again, Durkheim contends that Socrates 
expressed more clearly than his judges the morality 
suited to his time. It would be easy to show that as 
, a result of the transformation of the old society 
phased on the gens, and the consequent disturb­
a n c e  of religious beliefs, a new morality and 
treligious faith had become necessary in Athens. 
This was not felt by Socrates alone, but also in a 
powerful current of opinion represented by the 
Sophists. It was in this sense that Socrates was 
ahead of his time, presaging social change, while 
at the same time expressing the spirit of the age 
(1953: pp. 64-65). Durkheim’s analysis of "moments 
of collective ferment", at which are born the great 
ideals upon which civilizations rest, is also 
illuminating (pp. 91-92).
On the negative side, severe distortions and 
assumptions have to be made to accommodate 
individuals and their relationships to the ideational 
model. In order to fit the scheme, induced be­
haviours have to be converted to ideas in the form 
of "social facts", which are then reified. When, for 
example, one examines not individual suicides, but 
the rate of suicide, "this total is not simply a sum of 
independent units, a collective total, but is itself a 
new fact sui generis, with . . .  its own nature . . . 
dominantly social" (Durkheim 1953: p. 46). This 
approach did not, however, prevent Durkheim from 
approaching the problem of suicide with a statisti­
cal treatment much in advance of his time.
Even ideas themselves cannot be subsumed
under the model at the: individual level, for 
"society" is something over and above them. 
Collective representations, produced by action 
and reaction between individual minds, are 
accordingly created, on a fallacious analogy with 
the supposed emergence of individual repre­
sentations (ideas) from the interaction of neural 
elements in the brain (1953: p. 27). Individual 
minds are not, so far as we know, like neural 
elements. Neither is the connexion between 
individual minds and collective representations 
(if these exist) at all demonstrably like that between 
neural elements and individual representations. 
The "emergence” of collective representations 
itself is a metaphor, again highly dubious, based 
on chemical combination, in which the product has 
properties over and above its interactive elements.
Such conceptual devices are required to fulfil at 
least three functions in Durkheim's scheme: 
(1) to maintain all elements of the model at the 
same ideational logical level, so that it can be 
structured; (2) to explain the normative force of 
society admittedly felt by its members; (3) to 
separate sociology from individual psychology. 
Thus Durkheim, in his model, is forced to reify 
the social facts and collective representations of 
society. He holds that social facts should be 
approached as if they had a reality independent of 
the observer. Collective representations provide a 
conceptual framework of action (1953: p. xxii). 
Society as thus constituted provides “an estab­
lished classification" of values, outside individuals, 
“which is not their own work, which expresses 
other than their own personal sentiments, and to 
which they are bound to conform” (p. 84). Although 
Durkheim elsewhere makes it clear that individual 
choice is possible within and even against the 
conceptual framework of collective representa­
tions (e.g. p. 61), a constant effort of will is needed 
so as not to confuse the emergent structure of 
society with “a monstrous Group M ind" (p. xxiii).
Functionalism as previously considered is not 
necessary to Durkheim's model, which is accord­
ingly freed from the social immobility inherent in 
functional models. A s  Peristiany points out, 
"Durkheimian society does not balance 'as in a 
budget', ends achieved with energy spent. Its 
standard of value is not that of the happiness of 
the greater number or of the average citizen. It is 
not social utility or even the survival of society 
under its material form." (Durkheim 1953: p. xxviii).
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Durkheim himself declares that to explain the 
function of ideas by the contribution they make to 
the maintenance of the equilibrium, the solidarity 
or the survival of a society is to misconstrue the 
central tenet of his sociology, that individuals are 
subordinated to society as a system of ideas
M O D EL  T H E O R Y
The survey of structural and pre-structural 
model-types which has just been made may 
broadly be summarized in a table. This does not 
presume to show the chronological or other 
influence of any one form of model upon another:
DED U CT IVE DEDUCTIVE/
INDUCT IVE
INDUCTIVE
(Empirical)
UN ITHEM AT IC Evolutionary 
(1855-1897) 
Diffusion 
(e.g. Perry 1927)
Diffusion 
(e.g. Rivers 1914)
PO LYTH EM AT IC Ideational 
(Durkheim 1919) 
Functional-Biological 
(Malinowski 1922-1945) 
Biological-Structural 
(Radcliffe-Brown 
1939-1952)
Idealized 
(Leach 1954)
Conflict
(Gluckman, Mitchell, 
Epstein 1942-1961) 
Ideal
(Gluckman 1955) 
Role-Structure 
(Nadel 1957)
N.B.— The above dates are only a rough guide in terms of significant publications.
(p. xxviii). This both explains the persistence of 
customs, as when individuals change their social 
environment but cling to their ideals as symbols of 
social identity, and leaves the way open for social 
change in terms of new ideas.
It must finally be observed that ideational models 
can logically be either inductive or deductive in 
form. Durkheim offers a composite model in which 
behaviour may first be induced in terms of statis­
tical rates. The result, however, becomes a unit on 
a new sui generis supra-individua! level, and is 
connected deductively with other units on the 
strength of generalizations derived from analogy 
and metaphor. Moreover, the relationship between 
"social facts" as thus produced and "collective 
representations", whose mode of inference is not 
clear, is not fully worked out. A  simpler ideational 
model might well be evolved deductively, as when 
one postulates from general experience what are 
the operative ideas of a society; or inductively, as 
when they are inferred from questioning repre­
sentative samples of social populations.
It may be proposed, however, that increasing 
knowledge of society has so far tended to bring 
about a change from deductive to inductive models 
with time. At the beginning, in the absence of 
empirical knowledge, an idealized scheme has to 
be superimposed on the limited data available, 
which their sparsity is often unable to contradict. 
A s  empirical knowledge grows, inductive proce­
dures tend to shape the model more and more, for 
otherwise it will not cover, and is not verified by, 
field data. The second and more sophisticated 
return to deduction in social science is suggested 
by Leach (and by Firth and the economists). The 
idealized deductive model is not in fact “profit­
able" as a representation of reality until the opera­
tor already possesses a profound inductive 
knowledge by experience of the society he is 
investigating. It is, as Firth says, “a deliberate 
construct, simplified from, or departing from, real 
life situations for heuristic purposes" (1954: p. 6). 
It has been described in the more developed 
science of economics as "a  closed symbolic 
representation of the interaction of certain econo-
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mic phenomena" (Stone and Jackson 1946: 
p. 555).
From the various considerations adduced in the 
present survey of models, it would appear that a 
social model in any form may serve the following 
purposes:
1. To make description and visualization of 
reality, or of real problems, more plain;
2. To provide general interrelation or explana­
tion of as wide a range of facts as possible 
in terms of the minimal number of inter­
connected general propositions or symbols 
of them, resting on the simplest, fewest, and 
most fully acceptable axioms;
3. To indicate fruitful possibilities for further 
theorizing, problem-finding and experimen­
tation within the field covered by the model : 
in a word, to promote further hypotheses;
4. To predict, as in applied anthropology, what 
will be the outcome of certain combinations 
of circumstances or variables which are 
comprised by the model.
These purposes evidently do not differ from 
those of social theory at large. But the contention 
isthat models are theory making use of a particular 
logical form: analogy.
ANALOGY
It seems logically necessary that all models 
bearing any reference to reality should be based on 
analogy. This is indeed a type of inference bearing 
a strong formal resemblance to induction itself. 
The induction used in social science is nearly 
always of the kind called by logicians "induction 
by simple enumeration" (Stebbing 1930: pp. 246- 
249). It involves counting a number of instances 
recognized as having certain properties in com­
mon, and proceeding by inference to the assump­
tion that all instances have these properties in 
common. This is to be contrasted on the one hand 
with “perfect” induction (Aristotle) in which every 
instance is known, and with "intuitive" induction 
on the other, the immediate apprehension of an 
inductive generalization on the strength of one 
observed instance (Stebbing 1930: pp. 243-244).
Analogy, likewise, involves inference from 
resemblances. But whereas with simple enumera­
tion the inference is from similarity of the known to 
the unknown within the same total class of 
phenomena, in analogy it is between different 
classes which are alleged or believed to resemble 
one another in the properties and relationships at
issue. To convert allegation into justified belief, 
and thus demonstrate analogy, it is necessary to 
show what Keynes calls a strong "positive 
analogy" and a weak "negative analogy" (1921) 
between the properties of members of the original 
and of the allegedly similar class.*ln other words, 
the respects in which the properties and relation­
ships of the two classes resemble one another 
should greatly outweigh the respects in which 
they differ, these similarities and differences 
should be explicitly stated, and the differences 
should be irrelevant to the comparison. Since 
knowledge of the properties and relationships of 
the classes is never complete, the total analogy 
will always include properties and relationships 
which are not known to belong, or not to belong, 
to the two classes being compared (Stebbing 
1930: p. 250).
The suggestion now is that models are a 
constructed class, or a set of interrelated con­
structed classes, with which the properties and 
relationships of corresponding classes of pheno­
mena seen "in real life" are being compared by 
analogy. The constructed class may be indicated 
by "expressive" signs, i.e. words, or by "substi­
tute" signs, i.e. symbols (Stout in Stebbing 1930: 
p. 115). Examples in the latter case are the deduc­
tive symbolic models of the economists and 
applied mathematicians. These are symbolic 
representations of the expected relationships 
between classes of phenomena: that is, synthetic 
general statements by analogy of what the rela­
tionships between corresponding phenomena in 
real life can be expected to be. They may be grossly 
simplified or abstracted from reality, and they may 
be problem-oriented to a degree that involves 
distortion of reality as a whole. But unless they 
bear some analogic resemblance to reality, they 
are surely not models of reality at all; and yet 
they cannot be “models" of anything else. Without 
some correspondence with reality, they are useless 
for that visualization, explanation and prediction 
of realitytwhich is their raison d'etre. Such models 
may be termed symbolic models.
Before proceeding to models expressed in 
words, the useful representational model, not 
discussed in terms of symbolism by Stout, arises. 
This is probably closest in conception to the
"Other considerations, such as “comprehensiveness” (Keynes), are felt out for 
simplicity of presentation.
f  For philosophers who hold an "ideal' 'theory of perception, It may be acceptable 
that “ reality” and the “constructed class” are mainly different sets of sense- 
data between which a relationship of correspondence holds.
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original use of the term “model": it is the physical 
model with which we are usually first acquainted. 
In a typical model of the brain, for example, such 
as is used for anatomical demonstration, the 
cerebrum in relation to the cerebellum, the 
mesencephalon, the pons and the medulla 
oblongata are shown by physical analogy between 
model and original. The model is a medial form 
representing many original dissected brains. The 
positive analogy is strong: similarity of form and 
interrelationships, perhaps colour, a one-to-one 
correspondence of detail in the original to detail 
in the model— arbor vitae to arbor vitae, brachia 
pontis to brachia pontis. The negative analogy is 
unimportant, that is, it does not introduce mis­
leading distortion for demonstration purposes. 
Plaster of Paris (or whatever material it may be) is 
not the same as brain tissue; the brain model may 
not be of the same size as an original brain, and 
so forth. Even three-dimensionality, however, is 
not an essential part of the positive analogy, for 
sufficient representation can be obtained from a 
two-dimensional brain-atlas with overlapping 
pictures of successive brain-ievels (e.g. Krieg 
1957). This might be called a pictorial representa­
tional model.
That the symbolic, representational and verbal 
forms of model are all intimately related is well 
known in an advanced science like physics. “It 
has often happened in physics”, say Einstein and 
Infeld, “that an essential advance was achieved 
by carrying out a consistent analogy between two 
apparently unrelated phenomena" (1961: p. 270). 
The development of wave mechanics, begun by 
de Broglie and Schrodinger in 1925-26 is an 
example of the achievement of a successful theory 
by means of a deep and fortunate analogy. Sim i­
larity was proposed, and verified, in the unlikely 
analogy between the properties of a standing wave 
in an oscillating chord (e.g. a violin string) and 
those of an atom emitting radiation. This “accous- 
tical analogy” (Einstein and Infeld 1961: p. 276) 
has become, with the special theory of relativity, 
the foundation of modern wave mechanics. In its 
working out, recourse must be had to mathematical 
(symbolic) models and sub-models, but its outline 
is also simply illustrated with the pictorial and 
verbal models which occur in the work quoted. 
Einstein and Infeld carefully point out that an 
understanding not only of the similarities but of
the differences of the analogy (i.e. the negative 
analogy) is important (p. 286).
These illustrations bring out what seem to be a 
number of important points. First, it is clear that 
the "constructed classes" of a model may be 
symbolically, verbally or even pictorially con­
structed independently in the mind of the investi­
gator, or they may be inductions from another, 
even unlikely, class of phenomena found in nature, 
with which the class of phenomena under investi­
gation is to be compared by analogy. Second, an 
important function of the positive analogy is 
evidently that its known dimensions in the model 
are to be projected onto corresponding but 
unknown dimensions in the phenomena under 
investigation, so that new properties for experi­
mental verification may be suggested about them. 
The known negative analogy is a stricture of the 
properties in respect of which the two classes in 
analogy cannot be compared. Again, the “model" 
is shown as a special form of theory, i.e. a synthetic 
general statement (or connected series of state­
ments) about what the relations between certain 
recurrent factors can be expected to be (Reader 
1961: p. 211), but a theory stated by analogy. 
Finally, it appears that models of all kinds may 
fulfil several functions: simplified representation 
(e.g. pictorial models), simplified interconnexion 
(e.g. symbolic models), simplified projection of 
properties (e.g. verbal models).
M E T A P H O R
Verbal models, with which in anthropology we 
are mainly concerned, may be only metaphorical or 
fully analogic in character. In the earlier anthro­
pological models, and more generally in the 
absence of inductive information, the place of 
analogy tended to be taken by metaphor. Perhaps 
because the concept is so well known, the defini­
tion of metaphor has not been easy. The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines it as "the figure of 
speech in which a name or .descriptive term is 
transferred to some object different from, but 
analogous to, that to which it is properly applic­
able". Aristotle ascribes the use of metaphor to 
delight in learning; Cicero traces it to the enjoy­
ment of the author's ingenuity in overpassing the 
immediate, or in the vivid presentation of the 
principal subject (Cope 1867). These views make 
metaphor a decoration, an entertainment and a 
diversion as opposed to its logical use in the
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dictionary definition. Ogden and Richards ap­
proach it from both the logical and the emotive 
standpoint: "Metaphor, in the most general 
sense, is the use of one reference to a group of 
things between which a given relation holds, for 
the purpose of facilitating the discrimination of an 
analogous relation in another group" (1930: p. 213); 
and again, "(Indirect means of arousal are poss­
ible) through the excitement of imagery (often 
effected at low levels of refinement by the use of 
metaphor)— used not, as in strict symbolizing, to 
bring out or stress a structural feature in a refer­
ence, but rather to provide, often under cover of a 
pretence of this elucidation, new sudden and 
striking collocations of references for the sake of 
compound effects of contrast, conflict, harmony 
. . .  or used more simply to modify and adjust 
emotional tone . . . "  (p. 240).
The philosopher Black, in a useful article 
(1954-55), has discussed three viewpoints on 
metaphor. The first, which he calls the substitution 
view, holds that a metaphorical expression is used 
in place of some equivalent literal statement. If it 
is asked why this substitution should be made, 
one answer, apart from the entertainment or 
emotive view, is that metaphor is a kind of cata- 
chresis. This means the use of a word in some 
new sense in order to remedy a gap in the vocabu­
lary. If the metaphor thus serves a genuine need, 
the new sense it introduces should quickly become 
part of the literal language. Hence, on this view 
new metaphors should at least sometimes be in
process of being absorbed (Black 1954-55: pp. 279- 
280).
To hold that a metaphor, consists in the presen­
tation of an underlying analogy, or similarity, is 
to take what Black calls the comparison view. 
When Schopenhauer called a geometrical proof a 
mousetrap, he was, according to this view, impli­
citly saying that like a mousetrap, a geometrical 
proof offers a delusive reward, entices its victim 
by degrees, leads to a disagreeable surprise, and 
so on (Black: p. 283). It will be observed that the 
comparison view is a special case of the substi­
tution view: for it holds that the metaphorical 
statement might be replaced by an equivalent 
literal comparison.
The view which Black himself favours is the 
interaction view. In Richards’ words (1936: p. 93): 
"... when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts 
of different things active together and supported 
by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a 
resultant of their interaction". These "thoughts", 
according to Black, arise out of the system of 
associated commonplaces: the statements which 
the reader, or listener, would make as a layman, 
without taking special thought, of those things 
which he held to be true about the class invoked 
by the metaphor. In this form, Black commits the 
interaction view to the following seven claims. For 
brevity, they are set out in tabular form, with the 
present writer's criticisms in terms of the “com­
parison" view alongside:
“IN T ER A C T IO N " V IE W  OF M E T A P H O R
1. A  metaphorical statement has two distinct 
subjects— a “principal" and a "subsidiary" 
one.
2. These subjects are often best regarded as 
"systems of things” rather than "things”.
3. The metaphor works by applying to the 
principal subject a system of “associated 
implications" characteristic of the associated 
subject.
4. These implications usually consist of com­
monplaces about the subsidiary subject, but 
may, in suitable cases, consist of deviant 
implications established ad hoc by the user.
C R IT IC IS M  — "C O M P A R IS O N "  V IE W —
What are these but members of two separate and 
allegedly parallel classes as compared in analogy?
The "system of things" are surely the sets of 
properties defining the classes in analogy.
The "associated implications" are surely proper­
ties alleged to be held in common— i.e. the positive 
analogy— between the classes being compared.
In scientific metaphor they may have been care­
fully thought out— as a positive analogy.
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“IN T E R A C T IO N ” V IE W  OF M E T A P H O R — Cont.
5. The metaphor selects, emphasizes, sup­
presses, and organizes features of the 
principal subject by implying statements 
about it which normally apply to the subsi­
diary subject.
6. This involves shifts in the meaning of words 
belonging to the same family or system as the 
metaphorical expression; and some of these 
shifts, though not all, may be metaphorical 
transfer. The subordinate metaphors are, 
however, to be read less emphatically.
7. There is in general no simple “ground" for the 
necessary shifts of meaning— no blanket 
reason why some metaphors work and others 
fail.
C R IT IC IS M — “C O M P A R IS O N ” V IE W — Coni.
i.e. selective positive analogy.
This leads to an infinite regress of sub-metaphors 
within the meaning of the main metaphor, against 
which Black barely defends himself.
The sole ground is that the classes drawn in 
analogy are appropriately or not appropriately 
compared; i.e. that their positive analogy is or is 
not strong.
Black believes that it is easy to overstate the 
conflicts between these three views, and that they 
may all be true in different cases. But, he says, 
only the "reaction" view is of importance in 
philosophy. The present contention is that only a 
developed form of the “comparison” viewpoint—  
what might be called the "analogic” view— is 
useful in social science.
Setting aside its emotive and decorative uses, 
metaphor would appear to be a summary form of 
analogy, but unexpanded: that is, with the positive 
and negative analogies either uninvestigated, un­
expressed, or not under control. Metaphor seems 
an implied analogy in which one, or at most very 
few, striking items of positive analogy are seized 
upon, without regard for the rest of the positive, 
and the probably substantial negative analogy. 
Conversely, logically unsatisfactory analogies, 
with disproportionately large negative analogies, 
are often unihvestigated metaphors expanded 
into analogies by argument.
Some of these points are well brought out by the 
comments of Firth on Radcliffe-Brown's use of the 
“network" metaphor: “Now no one thought that 
he meant that he was dealing with either a meshed 
fabric held together by knots, or an arrangement 
with intersecting lines and interstices recalling 
such a fabric. We can take it for granted that like 
a modern painter, when he wrote network he was 
expressing what he felt by describing metaphoric­
ally what he saw." (1954: p.4). Firth is here bringing
to light part of the substantial negative analogy of 
the class-term “network", which unfits it for 
analogy with the arrangement of relationships 
between persons. He implies that the metaphor 
was never meant to be expanded into an analogy, 
but is only of assistance in "seeing" a non­
material situation in material terms. He goes on, 
“Bentham (1931) has a pertinent remark about the 
danger of metaphors being used at first for 
illustration or ornament and afterwards made the 
basis of an argument. . . "  (1954: p. 5).
Since the negative analogy in metaphors, when 
revealed, is likely to be uncontrolled and high, the 
metaphor is not, without caution, suitable for use 
in models. It cannot be maintained, since analogy 
is involved, that the use of metaphor as or in a 
model is logically invalid, but only that it is re­
stricted and possibly misleading. Suitably chosen, 
it could make description and visualization of 
reality more plain, provide some explanation of a 
range of interconnected facts, and even be asso­
ciated with problem-orientation and prediction. 
It is suggested, however, that it would perform the 
last two functions much better either when 
expanded into an analogy or when its implicit 
analogy is known to be positive and dominant. 
Otherwise it functions as a model only in assisting 
the operator to visualize that which is not visible, 
with some danger from the contra-indications of 
its unknown negative analogy.
In practice, many of the anthropological models
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reviewed above consist of partially expanded 
metaphors or incomplete analogies: these amount 
to the same thing. This is particularly true of 
models based on analogy with the biological 
organism. To begin with, the positive analogy of 
this model was artificially strengthened by select­
ing for the "reality" side of the analogy only 
small-scale, relatively homogeneous communities. 
These were obviously more closely analogous to 
an organism in equilibrium than large-scale urban 
groups would have been. Even so, the positive 
analogy was limited and the negative analogy only 
partially expanded. In the positive analogy were 
used the properties and relations of functional 
interdependence of parts and need-satisfaction, 
both resting on the presuppositions of closure and 
stable equilibrium. But the unexpanded negative 
analogy was formidable. The organic parts of a 
body were not like social persons in interrelation­
ship. Their dispositions and functions (e.g. the 
functions of the kidney and liver) were entirely 
different from those of a society. The surface of 
the body was not like the often arbitrary boundaries 
of a community, the metabolic cycle and physio­
logical changes had no precise counterpart in 
society, to speak of the sex of communities was 
meaningless, and so on indefinitely. Once the fact 
of "functional" interrelationship in homogeneous 
societies was grasped and utilized, it is hardly 
surprising that little further use was found for this 
analogy and the model it represented. It remains, 
if at all, as a metaphor, with the few items of 
relevant positive analogy and the unexpanded 
negative analogy characteristic of all metaphors.
This analysis of the logic of metaphor has 
perhaps gone too far in playing down the initial 
exploratory value of metaphors and their function 
in stimulating new hypotheses. It is no doubt a 
natural sequence of thought to proceed from the 
known to the unknown: to comprehend in one 
metaphorical leap a similarity between what has 
already been conceived and that which has still 
to be understood. The findings of this review 
suggest, however, that to adhere literally to the 
implied comparisons of a metaphor in the develop­
mental phase, when the broad association has 
already been grasped, may well inhibit further 
insight. If, through a large and unsuitable negative 
analogy, the metaphor does not bear expansion 
into a model, it should surely either be discarded 
when its early heuristic purpose has been achieved,
or its limitations should severely be borne in mind 
while no better model is available.
In practice the matter is not as clear-cut as this. 
Metaphors in social anthropology seem to be 
capable of varying degrees of partial expansion. 
Indeed there should be a continuum between the 
suggestive but totally unexpandable metaphor and 
the one which is so fruitful that it is virtually an 
analogic model. Somewhere along this continuum 
comes, for example, the "social network", ably 
initiated by Barnes (1954) and developed by Bott 
(1957) and later by Mayer (1961) and others. The 
“network" is “the total of ego's interpersonal 
relations with other individuals." (Mayer 1961: 
p. 9). In Barnes' words: "Each person is . . .  in 
touch with a number of people, some of whom are 
directly in touch with each other and some of 
whom are no t . . .  I find it convenient to talk of a 
social field of this kind as a network. The image I 
have is of a net of points, some of which are 
joined by lines. The points of the image are people, 
or sometimes groups, and the lines indicate which 
people interact with each other." (Barnes 1954: 
p. 43). This metaphor has been useful in explaining 
close-knit and loose-knit* community relations in 
Norway, England, and Black South Africa. It is 
doubtful, though, whether the taxonomy of net­
works recommended by Mayer (1962) would serve 
any useful purpose. That is taking the implied 
analogy too far.
S U M M A R Y
The material of this review can finally be sum­
marized as a set of considerations with respect to 
social models:
1. The logical form of the model should be 
clearly understood: whether inductive (em­
pirical) or deductive; whetherideal, idealized 
or ideational; whether unithematic or poly- 
thematic; and whether verbal, symbolic or 
pictorial. Models should not be set up at 
mixed logical levels without due caution.
2. Deductive idealized models seem appro­
priate to the early stages of a discipline, to 
open research in a little-known area. They 
also apply in the developed stages when 
much is already known inductively about the 
phenomena under review. For the inter­
mediate stages of research, empirical 
inductive models seem more fitting.
•Another metaphor. When metaphors are compounded in an Implied analogy, 
its comprehensiveness for a given situation may only be that of the weaker 
metaphor.
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3. Any model, however far “removed from 
reality" should always permit of inductive 
verification.
4. A  model should interrelate or "explain" the 
widest possible range of data in terms of the 
minimal number of connected propositions, 
based on the simplest, fewest and most 
fully acceptable presuppositions.
5. It should be problem-oriented, and should 
promote further hypotheses, or lead to 
predictions.
6. The positive and negative analogies of the 
model should be expanded and made mani­
fest as fully as possible, so that the logical 
validity of the model may be tested.
7. A  metaphor should not without caution be 
used in or as a model; and if it is used:
7.1 it should be expanded into an analogy by 
making manifest its positive and nega­
tive implied analogies; or if not so 
expanded,
7.2 its purpose in providing a tangible 
concept for intangible reality should be 
clearly stated, and its use restricted 
accordingly:
8. Presuppositions of closure and stability in
social models are arbitrary. Some models 
should also be based upon, and able to 
meet, assumptions of:
8.1 continuous social change unless dis­
turbed;
8.2 ubiquitous conflict, ambiguity and in­
consistency;
8.3 integration by constraint rather than 
consensus.
Finally, this review should not be misconstrued 
as recommending the exclusive and pervasive 
adoption of model-making as the only major 
theoretical tool In social science. Kaplan (1864: 
pp. 277-287) has adequately listed for us the 
shortcomings of models: their over-emphasis on 
symbols and on form, their oversimplification, their 
frequently misplaced rigour without deductive 
fertility, their misuse as "m aps" of pictorial 
realism, and the danger of the unconscious 
transition from “that's what it is like" to “that’s 
what it is". However, the dangers, as Kaplan says 
(p. 292), are not in working with models but in 
working with too few which are too much alike; and 
above all in belittling attempts to work with 
anything else.
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